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RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SQUARE: MAKING
DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
Suzanna Sherry*
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Judge Richard Posner ruled that the state of Illinois could
not celebrate Good Friday as a statewide holiday for the public
schools.' Closing all Illinois public schools on Good Friday, Posner
declared, violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution by
"plac[ing] the support of the state behind a wholly sectarian holiday."'2
The Ninth Circuit has disagreed, upholding Good Friday as a state
holiday in Hawaii. 3 Federal courts have similarly reached varying
conclusions about the constitutionality of other symbolic endorse-
ments of Christianity, including the use of a cross as part of a govern-
ment seal, the inclusion of the phrase "in the year of our Lord" in
government documents, and the singing of religious Christmas carols
in public schools. 4 Still other Christian rites are so intertwined with
American life that they are largely uncontroversial: for example, no
federal court has ever invalidated Sunday closing laws or the celebra-
tion of Christmas as a national holiday.
Despite these numerous overt governmental endorsements of
Christianity, a number of legal scholars have begun to conclude that
there is not enough religion in our public life.5 They argue that in our
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of Minnesota.
This Article was originally delivered as the Fourteenth Annual Lecture of the Center for
Church/State Studies at DePaul University.
1. Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 622 (7th Cir. 1995).
2. Id.
3. Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782 (9th Cir. 1991); accord Granzeier v. Middleton, 955
F. Supp. 741, 750 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (holding that the State did not violate the Establishment
Clause by closing courthouses on Good Friday).
4. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 2083, 2087-89 (1996); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, The Politics of
Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992); Julian R.
Kossow, Preaching to the Public School Choir: The Establishment Clause, Rachel Bauchman, and
the Search for the Elusive Bright Line, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 79 (1996).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE BOOK OF VIRTUES (1993); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVO-
TION (1993); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN
AMERICAN PoLrrICs (1991); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78
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secular society, religion is marginalized. Pointing to Supreme Court
doctrines that prohibit the government from funding religion or reli-
gious education, that limit the religious symbols that may be displayed
in public places, or that invalidate government-sponsored prayer, they
charge that in the United States, religion has become a mere hobby.6
To reinvigorate the American religious spirit, these scholars urge that
the government be permitted to engage in even more religious sym-
bolism, and indeed to fund religion and religious education.7 In short,
the government ought to encourage religious belief of all
denominations.
This Article focuses on one particular aspect of this growing debate
over the appropriate role of religion in our society. What is often
called the question of religion in the public square asks about the basis
on which citizens and legislators ought to make public policy deci-
sions. What, in our society, constitutes a legitimate reason for govern-
ment action and public policy? The debate about religion in the
public square is between those who maintain that all policies ought to
be justified by secular reasons accessible to believers and non-believ-
ers alike, and those who maintain that religious justifications are as
legitimate as secular ones.8
Focusing in this way on the factors influencing and justifying public
policy formation, rather than on the content of public policy itself,
subtly changes the nature of the debate. Judge Posner, in his opinion
striking down the Good Friday holiday,9 captured the difference be-
tween religious public policies and religious justifications for general
public policies. After finding the Illinois law unconstitutional, he
VA. L. REV. 671 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!":
Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163 (1993).
6. See supra note 5.
7. See supra note 5.
8. For a representative sampling of this debate, see, for example, KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); PERRY, supra note 5; JOHN RAWLS, POLIT-
ICAL LIBERALISM (1993); Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations
of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989); J. David Bleich, Godtalk: Should Religion In-
form Public Debate?, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1513 (1996); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence
G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577 (1996); Edward B. Foley, Tillich
and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954 (1992); Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion and
Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L. & RELIG. 325 (1984); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance
of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secu-
lar": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989); David M. Smo-
lin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to
Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal De-
mocracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the
Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993).
9. Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
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noted: "Had Illinois made a forthright official announcement that the
public schools shall be closed on the Friday before Easter in order to
give students and teachers a three-day spring weekend, rather than to
commemorate the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, we might have a differ-
ent case."'10 Similarly, a "moment of silence" statute adopted out of a
desire to encourage students to pray raises different questions than
one adopted to give students an opportunity to bring their minds and
bodies into focus for the coming school day.1 Even apparently secu-
lar policies-such as a law regulating particular types of abortion, or
prohibiting homosexual conduct-can be adopted for religious rea-
sons or for secular reasons, and the debate over religion in the public
square asks whether it is democratically and constitutionally legiti-
mate to allow laws that cannot be, or have not been, justified in secu-
lar terms.
I doubt I will be giving too much away by first suggesting that reli-
gious reasons should not be deemed legitimate justifications for public
policy. All laws should be justified by secular reasons accessible to all
citizens, whether religious or not. But rather than repeating the theo-
retical defenses of such a position, already amply articulated by the
likes of John Rawls and Robert Audi, 12 or boring you with an esoteric
treatise on how religious justifications violate the Supreme Court's
ever-changing Establishment Clause doctrine, this Article takes a
more pragmatic approach, focusing on the consequences of permitting
religion into the public square. This Article asks and answers a more
practical question: Why should anyone fear legislators or citizens who
openly speak and vote their consciences, even when those consciences
are informed or dictated by religious beliefs?
Put that way, of course, it sounds a little like asking why we should
fear motherhood or apple pie. Of course we want legislators to be
conscientious and principled, and if individual legislators in fact derive
some or all of their principles from their religious beliefs, they should
be free to say so. If their constituents do not approve, they can vote
the rascals out.
And there, exactly, lies the problem with such a scheme: Relying on
constituent desires has different implications depending on whose per-
spective we take. While mainstream Christians, as members of the
dominant religious sect in the United States, may be able to use their
power at the polls, members of many minority religions are not so well
situated. Thus, this Article explores the effect that allowing religion
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 246; Audi, supra note 8, at 272.
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into the public square has on the religious freedom of religious minor-
ities-in particular, its effect on the religious freedom of American
Jews.
The question is one on which members of minority religions can
reasonably differ. Legal scholar and Mormon Frederick Gedicks has
recently asked whether minority religions are in more danger from a
secularized society or from a religious society in which the majority
religion has established predominance. 13 The answer, he says, is "un-
clear."' 14 Some neo-conservative thinkers, on the other hand, includ-
ing prominent Jews such as Gertrude Himmelfarb, Irving Kristol, and
Norman Podhoretz, have long argued that secular humanism, not
Christianity, poses the greatest threat to America's future, including
the future of its religious minorities.'5 Kristol wrote in 1991: "Ameri-
can Jews, alert to Christian anti-Semitism, are in danger of forgetting
that it was the pagans-the Babylonians and the Romans-who de-
stroyed the temples and twice imposed exile on the Jewish people. '1 6
Those who advocate increasing the role of religion in public life
contend that such a change advances religious freedom for all Ameri-
cans; theirs is a non-sectarian plea for greater religiosity generally.1 7
And indeed, they must make that claim, for in our religiously diverse
nation religion's role in public life must be neutral as between reli-
gions. But however appealing this plea may sound in the abstract, this
Article suggests that in America, in actuality, allowing religious rea-
sons to justify public policy will have a negative effect on religious
minorities, especially Jews. The idea of favoring religion in general
over non-religion is a chimera, because in America, such a policy will
always have the effect of favoring Christianity over other religions.' 8
This Article explores three ways in which allowing religion into the
public square injures Jews. Allowing more religion into the public
square would hurt American Jews as a matter of politics,' 9 psychol-
ogy,20 and epistemology. 21 The first two issues have been explored by
13. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Introduction: An Ambivalent View of the Religious Equality
Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 561, 567-68 (1996).
14. Id.
15. Irving Kristol, The Future of American Jewry, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1991, at 21.
16. Id.
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18. I leave aside the question of the effect on the non-religious, who are outside even truly
non-sectarian appeals to religion.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
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other scholars, so I discuss them relatively briefly, saving the bulk of
my remarks for the third question.
I. POLITICS
What sorts of political outcomes might we expect if we allow reli-
gious appeals to influence public policy? The answer may be summa-
rized in two words: Jews lose. Christianity and Christian beliefs are so
pervasive in our society that it is virtually impossible for most relig-
iously-inspired political disputes to take place on neutral ground. This
is not simply a matter of numbers, of Jews being outvoted. Indeed,
some of the strongest evidence that greater accommodation of reli-
gion does not benefit-and may even harm-Jews comes not from
legislatures, but from the Supreme Court, which is supposedly im-
mune from partisan religious politics. 22
Despite my promise not to bore you with a legal treatise, I must
give a little doctrinal background before documenting the Supreme
Court's abysmal record. The religion clauses of the Constitution,
taken together, prohibit the government from either establishing reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.23 The Supreme Court
has made clear that the government is prohibited from favoring either
religion in general over non-religion, or any particular religion over
any other religion.24
The Establishment Clause doctrine that governs the cases I focus on
was laid out in Lemon v. Kurtzman25 in 1971. According to that case,
the Establishment Clause generally prohibits the government from
engaging in any action that: (1) has no secular purpose; (2) has the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) results in ex-
cessive entanglement with religion.26 Thus, for example, the govern-
ment may not subsidize religious schools,27 may not require
22. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (striking down a governmental
attempt to accomodate Jewish religious beliefs).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding as unconstitutional state efforts
to reimburse private religious schools for salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials).
25. Id. at 625.
26. Id. at 612-13.
27. Id. at 625; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (striking down an Ohio law that
supplied instructional material to church-sponsored schools, but allowing diagnostic and thera-
peutic services); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding that Pennsylvania's plan of
lending money and textbooks to non-public, church-sponsored schools was unconstitutional);
Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (ruling that New




schoolchildren to pray28 or employers to give employees their Sabbath
day off, 29 and may not require religious oaths for public office. 30
There is some uncertainty about whether the Lemon doctrine still re-
tains much vitality, 31 but for the purposes of the cases I discuss, that
doubt is irrelevant.
As for the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has recently
changed its doctrine.32 But during the time frame covered by this Ar-
ticle, the Free Exercise Clause did more than simply prohibit the gov-
ernment from intentionally discriminating against or regulating
religious beliefs. It also required the government to grant accommo-
dations to those whose religious beliefs might be compromised by
laws of general applicability. 33 Thus, Amish parents who objected to
compulsory schooling laws had to be exempted from those laws. 34
Sabbatarians who refused to work on Saturdays could not be denied
unemployment compensation for that reason.35 Note that the govern-
ment was not required to accommodate citizens who objected to the
laws for serious and important non-religious reasons-such as a philo-
sophical belief that children are better off educated at home, or a de-
sire to spend Saturdays with one's family.
Jews have brought claims under both the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause, and they have always lost.36 First, there are
the Sunday closing law cases. In one case, Sunday closing laws were
challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause. 37 The Court
28. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down a Pennsylvania
law that required school children to recite the Lord's Prayer and other Bible verses at the start of
each day); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (ruling that a New York law requiring the recita-
tion of the official state prayer was unconstitutional).
29. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down a Connecticut law
that provided Sabbath observers with an absolute right not to work on the Sabbath).
30. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that it was unconstitutional to deny
an individual public office for failing to state that he believed in God).
31. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795
(1993) (arguing that the test established by the Supreme Court in Lemon is no longer legally
valid).
32. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that although it is constitu-
tionally permissible to exempt sacramental peyote use from the operation of drug laws, it is not
constitutionally required).
33. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
34. Id.
35. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
36. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (refusing to accomodate Jewish-owned
businesses with Saturday closings in place of the mandatory Sunday closings); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding a Maryland Sunday closing law, above the objections
of non-Christian businessmen).
37. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 422.
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upheld the laws, finding a secular purpose for both mandating a day of
rest and choosing Sunday as the particular day. Chief Justice Warren
conceded that Sunday closing laws were originally religiously moti-
vated, but dismissed the claim nevertheless: "Sunday is a day apart
from all others," he wrote. 38 "The cause is irrelevant; the fact
exists. " 39
In a separate case, Jewish merchants tried to get an accommodation
to permit them to close on Saturday and stay open on Sunday, so that
they would not be forced to choose between their livelihood and their
religion.40 The Court rejected this Free Exercise claim as well.41 A
polity that does not recognize the religious nature of Sunday closing
laws, nor care about their effect on those who celebrate other Sab-
baths, despite the apparent protections afforded by the religion
clauses, is not likely to be sensitive to minority religions if public pol-
icy permits religious appeals. And note, by the way, that Sunday clos-
ing laws, while less frequent than they used to be, are still around: in
Minnesota, for example, while most stores are open, it is still illegal to
sell alcohol or automobiles on Sundays.42
Jews also lost in another case requesting a Free Exercise accommo-
dation of religious beliefs.43 Observant Jewish men are religiously re-
quired to wear a yarmulke, or skullcap. Unfortunately, military
regulations prohibit wearing headgear indoors.4 4 When a Jewish
member of the Air Force was disciplined for wearing his yarmulke,
the Supreme Court upheld the punishment, rejecting the Free Exer-
cise claim.45 Thus, the Amish need not send their children to high
school,46 a Seventh Day Adventist need not work on Saturday to be
eligible for unemployment compensation, 47 a Jehovah's Witness is en-
titled to quit work in a munitions factory without forfeiting unemploy-
ment compensation,48 and a Christian, whose refusal to work on
Sunday stems not from his membership in a sect that prohibited such
work, but rather from his own personal religious beliefs, is similarly
38. Id. at 452.
39. Id.
40. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602.
41. Id. at 609.
42. MINN. STAT. § 340A.504(4) (1997) (banning Sunday retail sales of intoxicating liquors); id.
§ 168.275 (forbidding sale of motor vehicles on Sundays).
43. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986).
44. See id. at 505.
45. Id. at 510.
46. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S 205, 234 (1972).
47. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
48. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981).
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protected.49 All these Christian sects can find solace in the Constitu-
tion, but the Constitution offers no protection for Jews in the military.
Finally, there is one case in which the Supreme Court struck down a
government attempt to accommodate Jewish religious beliefs. 50 Re-
call that under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court required the gov-
ernment to accommodate the religious beliefs of various sects. But
when the State of New York tried to accommodate orthodox Hasidic
Jewish families by allowing them to create a separate school district,
so that their handicapped children could receive state-supported edu-
cational assistance without having to attend local public schools where
they would be ridiculed, the Supreme Court found a violation of the
Establishment Clause.51
I do not fault the Supreme Court in particular. Its rulings in this
context merely reflect the fact that Christianity is so interwoven with
American culture that its manifestation is often perceived as secular,
while Judaism is either invisible or an alien religion that makes unfa-
miliar and unreasonable demands. Jews were invisible in one of the
Sunday closing decisions, in which the Court wrote that "[p]eople of
all religions ... regard Sunday as a time for famility activity, for visit-
ing friends and relatives, for late sleeping, for passive and active enter-
tainments, for dining out, and the like."' 52 Even the common appeal to
a purportedly Judeo-Christian tradition reflects this tendency to over-
look the fact that Jews are not Christians. As legal scholar Mark
Tushnet has pointed out: "[O]nly Christians can describe a Judeo-
Christian tradition because they orient themselves to a set of ideas
that includes elements that comprise the essence of Judaism [while]
Jews do not orient themselves to a set of ideas that includes elements
that comprise the essence of Christianity. '53
Outright hostility to Judaism has an even longer history in the
United States, even among Supreme Court Justices. Justice Joseph
Story held in 1844: "Christianity [is] a part of the common law of the
state [in that] its divine origin and truth are admitted ... [while Juda-
ism is a] form of infidelity."' 54 In 1892, the Court held that the United
States "is a Christian nation. ' 55 Thirteen years later, Supreme Court
Justice David Brewer gave a series of lectures to students at
49. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987).
50. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994).
51. Id. at 690.
52. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451-52 (1961).
53. Mark V. Thshnet, The Concept of Tradition in Constitutional Historiography, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 93, 94 n.6 (1987).
54. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 127, 198 (1844).
55. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
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Haverford College explaining approvingly why the United States was
a Christian nation.56 Justice Brewer explained that it was the patriotic
duty of every citizen to extend the principles of Christianity:
From the standpoint of citizenship the treatment of Christianity
may be regarded as in some respects similar to that which is ac-
corded and is due the national flag .... An insult to it every citizen
feels is an insult to himself, and all insist that it shall be accorded its
due respect.57
I am not the first to note that when it comes to Jews, the Supreme
Court has been conspicuously unsolicitous of religious freedom.
58
Nor I am alone in pointing out that Christian America in general has a
long history of indifference or even hostility toward Judaism. As one
legal scholar has recently put it: "Christian ... imperialism ... pulses
through the American social body."' 59 This history makes me very
skeptical of claims that increasing religious participation in govern-
ment would be good for all religions and not just for Christianity. If
Christians making public policy often cannot even perceive the reli-
gious nature of their own symbols, or the difference between them-
selves and Jews, they are unlikely to recognize, much less to rectify,
instances where religion in the public square is really just Christianity
in the public square.
II. PSYCHOLOGY
An extensive discussion of the psychological dimensions of religion
in the public square is beyond the scope of this Article. Let me just
note that the key to understanding the problem lies in the different
approaches of Christians and Jews when it comes to making public
declarations of religious beliefs. Encouraging citizens and legislators
to articulate the religious basis of their convictions necessarily means
that one's religious views will be made public. Indeed, the whole
point of many of the claims that religion is marginalized in our society
is to urge that religion be moved from the private sphere to the public.
But Judaism has always been a private, rather than a public religion.
Its adherents have felt little need to proselytize (at least in modern
times). Jews, unlike at least evangelical Christians, are quite comfort-
56. See generally DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN NATION (1905) (con-
taining a collection of Justice Brewer's lectures).
57. Id. at 51-52. This was long before flag-burning became a popular pastime and a political
football.
58. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise
Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 153, 154 (1996).
59. Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 872 (1996).
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able with "the understanding that one should voice [religious] com-
mitments primarily within one's community of faith and not
abroad. '60 This is a source of puzzlement to some Christians. Larry
Lewis, who supervises Southern Baptist missionaries, asks Jews: "[I]f
your religion is so great, why aren't you on the street evangelizing? '61
Privatizing religion and excluding it from the public domain, more-
over, was what allowed Jews to escape the ghettos to which pre-En-
lightenment regimes confined them.62 Until religion became formally
irrelevant to one's public standing, Jews could never be full citizens.
Finally, as legal scholar Theodore Blumoff has pointed out: "[T]he
fear of identifying one's religion in public discourse is the Holocaust's
bequest to many American Jews."' 63 Jews are thus less likely to use
religious arguments in public debate, further magnifying the effect of
Christian domination of the public square.
III. EPISTEMOLOGY
While politics and psychology thus give Jews reason to fear in-
creased religion in the public square, there is an even greater danger
from what might be called the differing epistemologies of Judaism and
Christianity. Let me start with a brief overview of my argument,
which I will describe in greater detail. I begin, first, with a distinction
between two worldviews: a religious worldview and a secular
worldview. A religious worldview is based primarily on faith, and a
secular worldview primarily on reason. The European Enlightenment
marks the transition from the one to the other. To the extent that the
conflict between the religious and the secular reflects an underlying
difference between an appeal to faith and an appeal to reason, mod-
ern American Judaism-especially Reform Judaism, but Conservative
Judaism as well-is a post-Enlightenment religion. While some Chris-
tian sects may be similarly committed more to reason than to faith,
those who prefer religious to secular justifications-and thus those
who would most benefit from increased religion in the public square-
are mostly faithful in a traditionally pre-Enlightenment way. More-
over, to the extent that faith can be supported by reason, there is no
need to inject religion into the argument. Thus, to appeal to religious
60. DAVID A. HOLLINGER, SCIENCE, JEWS, AND SECULAR CULTURE: STUDIES IN MID-TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 31 (1996).
61. Jeffrey Goldberg, Some of Their Best Friends Are Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, § 6
(Magazine), at 42, 43.
62. Alvin J. Reines, Ontology, Demography, and the Silent Holocaust, 38 JUDAISM: Q.J. 478,
481-82 (1989).
63. Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Holocaust and Public Discourse, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 591, 596
(1994-95).
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belief is to appeal to faith rather than to reason, and in the United
States the appeal to faith necessarily excludes most Jews.
In drawing a distinction between faith and reason, I do not want to
overstate my case. I do not mean that religious beliefs are necessarily
unreasonable, nor that secular beliefs can be derived from some ab-
stract reasoning process. What I mean is that faith and reason are
ultimately appeals to different sources of knowledge, with different
types of proof. To have faith is to believe, despite the absence of what
we would ordinarily consider rational evidence. It is to rely on
sources of knowledge that are, in the end, inaccessible to those who
do not share the same faith. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in describ-
ing Abraham's faith, against all reason, in God's promise that Abra-
ham would be the father of nations, captures the essence of this
difference:
And being not weak in faith, he considered not his own body now
dead, when he was about an hundred years old, neither yet the
deadness of Sarah's womb: He staggered not at the promise of God
through unbelief, but was strong in Faith, giving glory to God; And
being fully persuaded that, what he had promised, he was able to
perform.64
Indeed, most of the more extraordinary events recounted in the Bible
are, as a matter of historical probabilities, unreasonable. It requires
faith to read the Bible as history rather than as allegory, because there
is no reasonable evidence of its truth.
Because faith is, as legal scholar Michael McConnell points out, a
belief in "the irresistible conviction of the authority of God," 65 any
argument grounded in religious faith can ultimately be reduced to a
claim about what God requires. Although some of these arguments
can take rational form-such as disputes about the correct interpreta-
tion of sacred texts, about appropriate human goals or behavior,
about whether particular obligations exist-they are nevertheless dis-
putes about how we should determine what God commands. Those
who do not share a belief in the same God or the same sacred texts
have little or nothing to contribute to the discussion.
Secular reason, on the other hand, is our ordinary, everyday, shared
approach to the world. It is accessible to any normal human adult. It
incorporates accumulated observation, scientific knowledge, experi-
ence, logical deductions, and judgments of plausibility. And do not be
misled by the term reason. It is not an abstract process, nor does it
64. Romans 4:19-21 (King James).




necessarily yield firm results: a reasonable conclusion need not be
shatterproof to be warranted. Nevertheless, despite room for disa-
greement about outcomes, reasoning can be done well or badly. It
can contain inconsistencies and failures to notice logically necessary
connections. It can fit poorly with experience or with one's other be-
liefs, or have unpalatable implications. It can be based on faulty
premises, unchallenged only because of a failure to look at them rea-
sonably. Thus, it is reason that tells us not to believe someone who
says he was abducted by extraterrestrials, and reason that allows us to
accept well-documented reports that a sheep has been cloned.
Faith has no such limitations or qualifications. To have faith is to be
able to ignore contradictions, contrary evidence, and logical implica-
tions. Indeed one test of faith is its capacity to resist the blandish-
ments of rationality: the stronger the rational arguments against a
belief, the more faith is needed to adhere to it. Evolutionary biologist
Richard Lewontin quotes Kant scholar Lewis Beck: "[A]nyone who
could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to an om-
nipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature
may be ruptured, that miracles may happen. ' 66 Reason (and the sci-
entific method), states Lewontin, excludes "any role for supernatural
demons, witches, and spirits of every kind, including any of the vari-
ous gods from Adonai to Zeus."67
Moreover, reason is skeptical in a way that faith cannot be: we
should be prepared to alter our reasonable beliefs when confronted
with credible evidence of their falsity. Faith cannot be skeptical, be-
cause the validity of beliefs based on faith is not testable by ordinary
rational means. The methods of science and rational argument are of
no avail in evaluating claims based on faith. As one legal scholar puts
it: "The process by which one develops belief in a transcendent real-
ity-acquires faith-is not, cannot be, a rational process, for the valid-
ity of the objects of one's faith cannot be observed or tested, nor can it
be logically proven. '68 Nor can faith ever be rationally disproven, for
while "incoherence, anomaly, and paradox always count as weak-
nesses in scientific theory," they do not for traditional religious
thought. 69 Indeed, "[w]hat we might deem a 'paradox,' and therefore
66. Richard Lewontin, Billions and Billions of Demons, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 9, 1997, at
28, 31.
67. Id. at 29.
68. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some
Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1604 (1987).
69. JEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE QUEST
FOR AUTONOMY 105 (1981).
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a weakness, traditional theology christens a 'mystery,' to be accepted
on faith. '70
The European Enlightenment marked the beginning of a transition
from a world dominated by faith to a world dominated by reason. The
lasting accomplishment of the Enlightenment was to deny the primacy
of faith in the public sphere. Religious faith can be comforting, it can
be inspiring, it can be sustaining; but the Enlightenment denied that it
could govern. The Age of Reason replaced the centuries-long age of
religion.
In one sense, then, the demand for greater acceptance of religious
justifications in public policy decisions is an attempt to ameliorate the
effects of the Enlightenment. Note that this fact does not make it ille-
gitimate: not all historical developments represent progress, and not
all demands for a return to an earlier regime should be rejected.
Sometimes we might be better off going backwards. I contrast pre-
Enlightenment faith with post-Enlightenment reason only as a way of
illustrating the difference between them and their relationship to the
question of religion in the public square.
What makes a return to pre-Enlightenment faith problematic, how-
ever, is that a reliance on faith rather than reason is quintessentially
Christian. Modern American Judaism-especially Reform Judaism,
but also Conservative Judaism (which together account for more than
ninety percent of American Jews)-has so incorporated Enlighten-
ment ideals that it has become largely a religion of reason. This incli-
nation toward reason, incidentally, is of great concern to some
Orthodox Jews, who blame Jewish adoption of Enlightenment ideas
for what has been called the "silent holocaust": the decline in religious
observance, and the rise in intermarriage, that is seen as potentially
leading to the eventual extinction of Judaism.71
Most American Jews, however, consider theirs a religion primarily
of reason rather than of faith.72 Indeed, Judaism has never been a
"religion" in the same sense that Christianity is; being Jewish has al-
70. Id. at 106.
71. Reines, supra note 62, at 482-83.
72. See, e.g., NAOMI W. COHEN, JEWS IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS
EQUALITY 47 (1992) (stating Judaism is a religion based on reason); MICHAEL A. MEYER, RE-
SPONSE TO MODERNITY: A HISTORY OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM 389-91 (1998)
(declaring basic principles of Reform Judaism which serve as a guide for the progressive ele-
ments of the faith); MARC LEE RAPHAEL, PROFILES IN AMERICAN JUDAISM: THE REFORM, CON-
SERVATIVE, ORTHODOX, AND RECONSTRUCTIONIST TRADITIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6
(1984) (noting the emphasis placed on the ability of reason to promote the progression of reli-
gious beliefs); W. Gunther Plaut, Emancipation-The Challenge of Living in Two Worlds, 38
JUDAISM: Q.J. 437, 447 (1989) (claiming that the Enlightenment merely espoused views already
embraced by Judaism); Eliezer Schweid, The Impact of the Enlightenment on Religion, 38 JUDA-
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ways been at least as much a question of culture and ritual, of commu-
nity and heritage, as of faith. One scholar notes that at the heart of
modern Conservative Judaism was "a refusal to cut Judaism to a
preconceived pattern of what a 'religion' should be like," instead
viewing it as "a living stream of tradition and aspiration. '73 Early He-
brew had no word for religion, since Jews considered themselves a
people, rather than adherents to a faith. 74 For Jews, religion is primar-
ily practice, not theology.75 Moreover, belief is unimportant in deter-
mining who is Jewish. One Jewish scholar writes:
A Christian is such by baptism or conversion, by being called out
into a new and sacred vocation of faith. A Jew is never not a Jew
according to Jewish law. He is born into the Jewish situation. There
was never a time that he was a man but not a Jew. There can be no
time when he will cease to be a Jew .... A Jew who does not keep
the Covenant still has its imprint engraved in his flesh. . . .The
world, moreover, has understood the indelibility of the covenant,
for it has persisted in regarding as Jews many who regard them-
selves as anything but Jewish; and it has murdered the seed of Abra-
ham into the third generation. 76
The Jewish reaction to the Enlightenment challenge to faith there-
fore differed from the Christian reaction. The Enlightenment re-
placed religious authority with secular authority and substituted
appeals to reason for appeals to God.77 Traditional Judaism, like
traditional Christianity, was threatened by this move, and fought back
against the leaders of the Jewish Enlightenment. 78 But since Judaism
had always placed less reliance on faith, it contained within it the pos-
sibility of a more accommodating reaction to the Enlightenment. The
Enlightenment also offered to Jews the possibility of emancipation
and freedom from anti-Semitism, further cementing Jewish attraction
to Enlightenment ideas.79 And so, within Judaism, men like Moses
iSM: Q.J. 389, 393 (1989) (adding that the Enlightenment only renewed beliefs already set forth
by Judaism).
73. Jacob B. Agus, The Conservative Movement. Reconstruction, in 2 UNDERSTANDING AMER-
ICAN JUDAISM: TOWARD THE DESCRIPTION OF A MODERN RELIGION 199, 205 (Jacob Neusner
ed., 1975).
74. CHARLES S. LIEBMAN, THE AMBIVALENT AMERICAN JEW: POLITICS, RELIGION, AND
FAMILY IN AMERICAN JEWISH LIFE 7 (1973). Liebman also suggests that "[l]abeling Judaism as
any kind of religion involves a measure of arbitrariness." Id.
75. JACOB NEUSNER, JUDAISM IN THE SECULAR AGE: ESSAYS ON FELLOWSHIP, COMMUNITY,
AND FREEDOM 55 (1970); see also NATHAN GLAZER, AMERICAN JUDAISM 132 (1957) ("[I]t
would be an unfortunate sign of Christian influence if Jews were now to start insisting on tenets
and doctrine.").
76. NEUSNER, supra note 75, at 55-56.
77. See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION 212-55 (1966).
78. See infra note 81.
79. See infra note 81.
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Mendelssohn tried to incorporate the insights of the Enlightenment
without losing their religion.80 The result was what has come to be
called Reform Judaism.8' Reform Judaism eventually denominated it-
self a "progressive religion, ever striving to be in accord with the pos-
tulates of reason. '82 One scholar surmises that "Jews lost their faith
so easily because they had no faith to lose .... All they had... was a
complete set of practices." 83
Indeed, the Jewish incorporation of Enlightenment ideals was so
complete that it withstood the nineteenth-century backlash against the
Enlightenment.84 While American Christians were undergoing waves
of evangelical religious awakenings, and the Romantic mood swept
literature, philosophy, and music, most American Jews remained
firmly committed to rationalism. 85 One scholar contrasts the Chris-
tian and Jewish experiences during the second Great Awakening:
"Emotionally charged individual conversions were the hallmarks of
the Christian experience, cold reason characterized the Jewish; the
first reflected the stamp of Romanticism, the second the imprint of the
Age of Reason. '86
Of course, there were still Jews opposed to the rationalism of the
Enlightenment. These traditionalists were eventually left with the la-
bel "Orthodox. '87 But fewer than eight percent of American Jews
consider themselves Orthodox.88 The rest are split about equally be-
tween Reform and Conservative, although most surveys give the edge
to Reform Judaism.8 9 The Conservative movement arose in the twen-
tieth century, as an American attempt to bridge the gap between Re-
form and Orthodox Judaism.90 Conservatism shares with the Reform
80. See infra note 81.
81. For history and descriptions of Reform Judaism, see generally MAX DIMoNr, JEWS, GOD,
AND HISTORY (1962); GLAZER, supra note 75; ARTHUR HERTZBERG, THE JEWS IN AMERICA:
FOUR CENTURIES OF AN UNEASY ENCOUNTER: A HISTORY (1989); LIEBMAN, supra note 74;
MEYER, supra note 72; RAPHAEL, supra note 72; Jacob B. Agus, The Reform Movement, in 2
UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN JUDAISM: TOWARD THE DESCRIPTION OF A MODERN RELIGION 5
(Jacob Neusner ed., 1975).
82. GLAZER, supra note 75, at 41-42 (quoting the declaration of principles adopted by a group
of reform rabbis in Pittsburgh in 1885, known as The Pittsburgh Platform).
83. Id. at 69.
84. Id. at 28-30.
85. See, e.g., GLAZER, supra note 75, at 29-30; MEYER, supra note 72, at 180.
86. COHEN, supra note 72, at 47.
87. MEYER, supra note 72, at 180-81.
88. See Council of Jewish Federations, 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (visited Feb. 9,
1998) <http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/cjstu/highint.htm>.
89. Id.
90. For history and descriptions of Conservative Judaism, see generally DIMONT, supra note
81; GLAZER, supra note 75; HERTZBERG, supra note 81; LIEBMAN, supra note 74; RAPHAEL,
supra note 72; Mordecai Waxman, The Ideology of the Conservative Movement, in 2 UNDER-
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movement a largely secularist epistemology, but emphasizes ritual and
observance of Jewish law more than Reform Judaism does.91 Even
Orthodox Judaism has its Enlightenment aspects. One eminent scien-
tist has suggested that the claim that science is constantly self-critical,
and open to the skepticism of reason, can be belied by comparing sci-
entific to Talmudic argument: "If [Carl] Sagan really wants to hear
serious disputation about the nature of the universe," writes Richard
Lewontin, "he should leave the academic precincts in Ithaca and
spend a few minutes in an Orthodox study house in Brooklyn. '92
Thus, in the United States, appeals to faith are necessarily appeals
to a non-Jewish mode of thought. For American Jews, the rationalism
of the Enlightenment is a much more congenial way of approaching
the world. Indeed, in this century American Jews both hastened the
movement toward, and prospered in, an increasingly secularized soci-
ety. Intellectual historian David Hollinger has explored the deep con-
nections between Jews and rationalism in mid-twentieth century
America in his book, Jews, Science, and Secular Culture.93 He con-
cludes that Jews played a large role in the cultural transformation that
turned a Christian America into a pluralist nation, and changed
American universities from gentlemen's finishing schools to vibrant
cultural and intellectual centers. 94 It was also the liberal ideals of the
Enlightenment that allowed Jews to join the American community.
The Enlightenment focused on intellect and away from pedigree, on
achievement rather than biography, on reason rather than faith, and
helped open doors that previously had been closed to Jews. 95 This
historical interrelationship between Jews and the Enlightenment fur-
ther strengthens the proposition that decreasing appeals to reason and
increasing appeals to religious faith would have a detrimental effect
on Jews.
STANDING AMERICAN JUDAISM: TOWARD THE DESCRIPTION OF A MODERN RELIGION 247 (Ja-
cob Neusner ed., 1975). It is also said that the Conservative movement got its start when, at a
dinner celebrating the graduation of the first class of rabbis from the Reform Hebrew Union
College, the kosher caterer served shrimp. GLAZER, supra note 75, at 56-57.
91. See GLAZER, supra note 75, at 76 ("Despite his deep love of every strand of Judaism and
Jewishness, Schecter [the founder of the American Conservative movement] was in other ways
an heir of the Reform movement, for he had a great faith in and devotion to modern scholar-
ship."); see also DiMoNT, supra note 81, at 370 (describing Conservative Judaism); MEYER, supra
note 72, at 295, 354 (noting Conservative Judaism's greater attention to the observance of Jewish
law); RAPHAEL, supra note 72, at 90, 101-02 (exploring the differences between Reform and
Conservative movements);Waxman, supra note 90, at 249 (differentiating Conservative and Re-
form Judaism).
92. Lewontin, supra note 66, at 30.
93. HOLLINGER, supra note 60.
94. Id. at 62-64.
95. Id. at 64.
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Moreover, the historical connection between Jews and the Enlight-
enment also runs in the other direction. Twentieth-century American
religious traditionalists are not the first to believe that "secular hu-
manism... brings darkness and destruction on humanity. '96 Intellec-
tual history-to say nothing of the history of the United States-is
filled with Romantics and other anti-liberals who viewed the Enlight-
enment as a tragic mistake.97 Unfortunately, attacks on the Enlight-
enment have often been associated with anti-Semitism and other
prejudices. 98 In earlier centuries, French counter-revolutionaries and
German Romantics, rejecting the Enlightenment and its fruits, argued
that reason was bad because it defeated prejudice.99 One French
counter-revolutionary explicitly traced the "noxious" influence of
Jews to the Enlightenment, condemning both.100 In this century, Mar-
tin Heidegger, whom one scholar labels "a towering figure of counter-
Enlightenment thought,"' 0' applauded the Nazis. Another lesser
known Nazi theorist, Carl Schmitt, linked Jews, liberalism, and the
Enlightenment, blaming all three-especially in the person of "the
first liberal Jew," Spinoza-for Germany's ills.102
This is not to suggest that those calling for increased religion in the
public square are themselves anti-Semitic. But it should sound a cau-
tionary note that just as Jews have had a historical attachment to En-
lightenment rationalism, anti-Semites have often been drawn from the
ranks of various anti-Enlightenment movements. 0 3 Hollinger's de-
scription of the role that Jews played in the secularization of Ameri-
can universities can be contrasted usefully with the work of the
evangelical Christian scholar, George Marsden. 10 4 Marsden, in his
book, The Soul of the American University, laments the same seculari-
zation that Hollinger applauds, and argues for a greater role for reli-
gion, especially for traditional Christianity. 0 5 If Hollinger's account is
96. STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTI-LIBERALISM 63 (1993).
97. For histories of some of these anti-liberal movements, see generally LOREN R. GRAHAM,
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND VALUES (1981); PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVrrT, HIGHER SUPER-
STrION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994); HOLMES, supra note
96; LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN
AMERICA (1964).
98. HOLMES, supra note 96, at 98.
99. Id. at 102-03.
100. Id. at 103.
101. Id. at 123.
102. Id. at 52 (quoting CARL SCHMITT, DER LEVIATHAN IN DER STAATSLEHRE DES THOMAS
HOBBES: SINN UND FEHLSCHLAG EINES POLITSCHEN SYMBOLS (1982)).
103. Id. at 98-99.
104. Compare HOLLINGER, supra note 60, with GEORGE MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMER-
ICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994).
105. MARSDEN, supra note 104.
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
correct, Marsden's condemnation of the secularization of American
universities is necessarily detrimental to Jews.
CONCLUSION
Two relatively recent developments highlight the dangers that reli-
gion in the public square can pose for religious minorities. In June
1996, the second-largest American religious body, the Southern Bap-
tist Convention, passed a resolution calling for Baptists to direct their
energies toward converting Jews.10 6 Baptist leaders were stunned by
the hurt and angry reaction this provoked not only among Jews but
among many Christians as well. 107 "Not a single one of us," said one
Southern Baptist leader, "imagined such a reaction.' 0 8 A large group
of American Christians seemed utterly unable to perceive the harm
their religiously-motivated actions might cause to Jews. And South-
ern Baptists are not alone. Richard Neuhaus, a prominent and politi-
cally vocal Catholic priest, recently praised the Baptist resolution. l0 9
Neuhaus is also one of the protagonists in the other recent develop-
ment. 110 For many years, conservative Christians like Neuhaus and
conservative Jews like Himmelfarb, Kristol, and Podhoretz worked to-
gether to challenge the reigning liberal paradigm in the United
States. 11' Apparently sharing the same political aims, the two groups
called for an abandonment of elite culture in favor of what they called
religious populism. 1 2 As noted earlier, the Jewish neo-conservatives
dismissed Jewish fears of Christian fundamentalism, arguing that reli-
gion, of whatever kind, was the solution, not the problem." 3 Then
last November, Neuhaus published a symposium in his journal, First
Things, that amounted to a declaration of war on his erstwhile al-
lies.114 The symposium makes clear that the goal of Neuhaus's Catho-
lic and evangelical Protestant alliance is to establish America as a
106. Goldberg, supra note 61, at 42-43.
107. Id. at 43.
108. Id. (quoting Larry Lewis, who until recently was the Southern Baptists' chief missionary
in North America).
109. Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square: A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public
Life, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1996, at 48-49.
110. The events in this paragraph are described in David Glenn, The Schism, LINGUA
FRANCA, Feb. 1997, at 24; Jacob Heilbrunn, Neocon v. Theocon, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1996,
at 20.
111. See supra note 110.
112. See supra note 110.
113. See supra note 110.
114. Symposium: The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics, FIRST THINGS,
Nov. 1996, at 18-42.
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Christian nation, even if that takes a Christian revolution. 15 Several
Jewish neo-conservatives immediately resigned from the editorial
board of First Things, and conservatives of many religions condemned
the journal.1" 6 Neuhaus, unchastened, praised the Baptist resolution
in December 1 7 and then published a discussion of the November
symposium in the January issue.118 The battle continues.
What lesson are we to take from all this? It is the lesson that the
Jewish neo-conservatives have just learned the hard way: In America,
public religion is always Christian.
115. Id.
116. Glenn, supra note 110, at 24; Heilbrunn, supra note 110, at 20.
117. Neuhaus, supra note 109.
118. William J. Bennett et al., The End of Democracy? A Discussion Continued, FIRST
THINGS, Jan. 1997, at 19-28.
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